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Abstract—Many methods are available to detect
silent errors in high-performance computing (HPC)
applications. Each comes with a given cost and recall
(fraction of all errors that are actually detected). The
main contribution of this paper is to characterize
the optimal computational pattern for an application:
which detector(s) to use, how many detectors of each
type to use, together with the length of the work
segment that precedes each of them. We conduct a
comprehensive complexity analysis of this optimiza-
tion problem, showing NP-completeness and design-
ing an FPTAS (Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation
Scheme). On the practical side, we provide a greedy
algorithm whose performance is shown to be close to
the optimal for a realistic set of evaluation scenarios.
Index Terms—Fault Tolerance; High-Performance
Computing; Silent Data Corruption; Partial Verifica-
tion; Supercomputer; Exascale.
I. Introduction
Failures in high-performance computing (HPC) systems
have become a major issue as the number of components
proliferates. Indeed, future exascale platforms are expected
to be composed of hundreds of thousands of computing
nodes [17]. Even if each individual node provides an
optimistic mean time between failures (MTBF) of, say 100
years, the whole platform will experience a failure around
every few hours on average, which is shorter than the
execution time of most HPC applications. Thus, effective
resilient protocols will be essential to achieve efficiency.
The de-facto general-purpose error recovery technique
in HPC is checkpoint and rollback recovery [13], [19]. Such
protocols employ checkpoints to periodically save the state
of a parallel application so that when an error strikes
some process, the application can be restored to one of
its former states. However, checkpoint/restart assumes
instantaneous error detection, and therefore applies to
fail-stop errors. Silent errors, a.k.a. silent data corruptions
(SDC), constitute another source of failures in HPC, whose
threat can no longer be ignored [29], [33], [27]. There are
several causes of silent errors, such as cosmic radiation,
packaging pollution, among others. In contrast to a fail-
stop error whose detection is immediate, a silent error is
identified only when the corrupted data leads to an unusual
application behavior. Such detection latency raises a new
challenge: if the error struck before the last checkpoint,
and is detected after that checkpoint, then the checkpoint
is corrupted and cannot be used for rollback.
In order to avoid corrupted checkpoints, an effective
approach consists in employing some verification mech-
anism and combining it with checkpointing [14], [30],
[1]. The simplest protocol with this approach would be
to execute a verification procedure before taking each
checkpoint. If the verification succeeds, then one can
safely store the checkpoint. Otherwise, it means that
an error has struck since the last checkpoint, which
was duly verified, and one can safely recover from that
checkpoint to resume the execution of the application. Of
course, more sophisticated protocols can be designed, by
coupling multiple verifications with one checkpoint, or
even interleaving multiple checkpoints and verifications [1],
[7]. The optimal pattern (i.e., number of verifications per
checkpoint) in these protocols would be determined by the
cost of executing a verification.
In practice, not all verification mechanisms are 100%
accurate and at the same time admit fast implementations.
In fact, guaranteeing accurate and efficient detection
of silent errors for scientific applications is one of the
hardest challenges in extreme-scale computing [3]. Indeed,
thorough error detection is usually very costly, and often
involves expensive techniques, such as replication [20]
or even triplication [26]. For many parallel applications,
alternative techniques exist that are capable of detecting
some but not all errors. We call these techniques partial
verifications, while a guaranteed verification is capable of
detecting all errors. One example is the lightweight SDC
detector based on data dynamic monitoring [3], designed
to recognize anomalies in HPC datasets based on physical
laws and spatial interpolation. Similar fault filters have
also been designed to detect silent errors based on time
series predictions [9]. Although not completely accurate,
these partial verification techniques nevertheless cover a
substantial amount of silent errors, and more importantly,
they incur very low overhead. These properties make them
attractive candidates for designing more efficient resilient
protocols.
Since checkpointing is often expensive in terms of
both time and space required, to avoid saving corrupted
data, we only keep verified checkpoints by placing a
guaranteed verification right before each checkpoint. Such
a combination ensures that the checkpoint contains valid
data and can be written onto stable storage. The execution
of the application is partitioned into periodic patterns, i.e.
computational chunks that repeat over time, and that
are delimited by verified checkpoints, possibly with a
sequence of partial verifications in between. Figure 1 shows
a periodic pattern with two partial verifications followed
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Figure 1. A periodic pattern (highlighted in red) with three segments,
two partial verifications and a verified checkpoint.
by a verified checkpoint.
The error detection accuracy of a partial verification can
be characterized by its recall r, which is the ratio between
the number of detected errors and the total number of
errors that occurred during a computation. For example, a
basic spatial based SDC detector has been shown to have
a recall around 0.5 measured on synthetic benchmarks [3],
which means that it is capable of detecting half of the errors.
Note that a guaranteed verification can be considered as
a special type of partial verification with a recall r∗ = 1.
Each partial verification also has an associated cost V ,
which is typically much smaller than the cost V ∗ of a
guaranteed verification.
An application can use several types of detectors with
different overheads. For instance, to detect silent errors
in HPC datasets, one has the option of using either the
detector based on time series prediction [9], or the detector
using spatial multivariate interpolation [3]. The first one
needs more data to make a prediction, hence comes at
a higher cost. However, its recall is also better. In the
example of Figure 1, the second verification may use a
detector whose cost is lower than that of the first one
(V2 < V1), but is expected to have a lower recall as well
(r2 < r1).
In this paper, we assume to have several detector types,
whose costs and recalls may differ. At the end of each
segment inside the pattern, any detector can be used. The
only constraint is to enforce a guaranteed verification after
the last segment. Given the values of C (cost to checkpoint),
V ∗ (cost of guaranteed verification), the cost V (j) and
recall r(j) of detector type D(j), the main question is
which detector(s) to use? The objective is to find the
optimal pattern that minimizes the expected execution
time of the application. Intuitively, including more partial
verifications in a pattern allows us to detect more errors,
and earlier in the execution, thereby reducing the waste due
to re-execution; but that comes at the price of additional
overhead in an error-free execution. Therefore, an optimal
strategy must seek a good tradeoff between error-induced
waste and error-free overhead. The problem is intrinsically
combinatorial, because there are many parameters to
choose: the length of the pattern, the number of partial
verifications, and the type and location of each partial
verification within the pattern. Of course, the length of an
optimal pattern will also depend on the platform MTBF µ.
Only very specific instances of the problem have received
a solution yet. For instance, when there is a single segment
in the pattern without intermediate verification, the only
thing to determine is the size of the segment. In the
classical protocol for fail-stop errors (where verification is
not needed), the optimal checkpointing period is known
to be
√
2µC (where C is the checkpoint time), as given
by Young [32] and Daly [16]. A similar result is known for
silent errors when using only verified checkpoints [7], [6]:
in that case, the optimal period is
√
µ(C + V ∗). These
formulas provide first-order approximations to the length of
the optimal pattern in the corresponding scenario, and are
valid only if the resilience parameters satisfy C, V ∗  µ. To
the best of our knowledge, the only analysis that includes
partial verifications is the recent work [12], which deals
with patterns that may include one or several detector(s),
but all of the same type. While most applications accept
several detector types, there has been no attempt to
determine which and how many of these detectors should
be used. This paper is the first to investigate the use
of different types of partial verifications, i.e., different
detectors.
We prove that this optimization problem is NP-complete.
We show that a detector is most useful when it offers a high
accuracy-to-cost ratio, defined as φ(j) = r(j)2−r(j) /
V (j)
V ∗+C . We
then propose a greedy algorithm and a fully polynomial-
time approximation scheme (FPTAS) to solve the problem.
Simulation results, based on a wide range of parameters
from realistic detectors, corroborate the theoretical study
by showing that the detector with the best accuracy-to-
cost ratio should be favored. In some particular cases with
close accuracy-to-cost ratios, an optimal pattern may use
two different detectors. Finally, the greedy algorithm has
been shown to work quite well in practice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II surveys related work. Section III introduces the
model, notations and assumptions. Section IV presents
key properties of optimal patterns. Section V provides a
comprehensive complexity analysis. While the optimization
problem is shown to be NP-complete, a simple greedy
algorithm is presented, and a fully polynomial-time ap-
proximation scheme is described. Simulation results are
presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII provides
concluding remarks and hints for future directions.
II. Related Work
Considerable efforts have been directed at detection
techniques to reveal silent errors. Hardware mechanisms,
such as ECC memory, can detect and even correct a
fraction of errors. Unfortunately, future extreme scale
systems are expected to observe an important increase in
soft errors because of power constraints at increased system
size. Most traditional resilient approaches maintain a
single checkpoint. If the checkpoint file contains corrupted
data, the application faces an irrecoverable failure and
must restart from scratch. This is because error detection
latency is ignored in traditional rollback and recovery
schemes, which assume instantaneous error detection
(therefore mainly targeting fail-stop errors) and are unable
to accommodate SDC. This section describes some related
work on detecting and handling silent errors.
A. Checkpoint versioning
One approach to dealing with silent errors is by main-
taining several checkpoints in memory [25]. This multiple-
checkpoint approach, however, has three major drawbacks.
First, it is very demanding in terms of stable storage: each
checkpoint typically represents a copy of a large portion
of the memory footprint of the application, which may
well correspond to tens or even hundreds of terabytes.
Second, the application cannot be recovered from fatal
failures: suppose we keep k checkpoints in memory, and
a silent error has struck before all of them. Then, all
live checkpoints are corrupted, and one would have to
re-execute the entire application from scratch. Third, even
without memory constraints, we have to determine which
checkpoint is the last valid one, which is needed to safely
recover the application. However, due to the detection
latency, we do not know when the silent error has occurred,
hence we cannot identify the last valid checkpoint.
B. Process replication
There are few methods that can guarantee a perfect
detection recall. Process replication is one of them. The
simplest technique is triple modular redundancy and
voting [26]. Elliot et al. [18] propose combining partial
redundancy and checkpointing, and confirm the benefit of
dual and triple redundancy. Fiala et al. [20] apply process
replication (each process is equipped with a replica, and
messages are quadruplicated) in the RedMPI library for
high-performance scientific applications. Ni et al. [28] use
checkpointing and replication to detect and enable fast
recovery of applications from both silent errors and hard
errors. However, full process replication is too expensive
to be used in extreme scale HPC systems and is usually
avoided for this reason.
C. Application-specific techniques
Application-specific information can be very useful
to enable ad-hoc solutions, which dramatically decrease
the cost of detection. Algorithm-based fault tolerance
(ABFT) [23], [10], [31] is a well-known technique, which
uses checksums to detect up to a certain number of errors
in linear algebra kernels. Unfortunately, ABFT can only
protect datasets in linear algebra kernels and it has to
be implemented for each different kernel, which incurs a
large amount of work for large HPC applications. Other
techniques have also been advocated. Benson, Schmit
and Schreiber [8] compare the result of a higher-order
scheme with that of a lower-order one to detect errors
in the numerical analysis of ODEs and PDEs. Sao and
Vuduc [30] investigate self-stabilizing corrections after error
detection in the conjugate gradient method. Heroux and
Hoemmen [22] design a fault-tolerant GMRES capable of
converging despite silent errors, and Bronevetsky and de
Supinski [11] provide a comparative study of detection
costs for iterative methods.
D. Analytics-based corruption detection
Recently, several SDC detectors based on data analytics
have been proposed, showing promising results. These
detectors use several interpolation techniques such as
time series prediction [9] and spatial multivariate inter-
polation [3], [4], [5]. Such techniques have the benefit of
offering large detection coverage for a negligible overhead.
However, these detectors do not guarantee full coverage;
they can detect only a certain percentage of corruptions
(i.e., partial verification). Nonetheless, the accuracy-to-
cost ratios of these detectors are high, which makes them
interesting alternatives at large scale. Most of the research
work done in this domain focuses on how to increase
the error detection accuracy while keeping low overhead,
but there has been no theoretical attempt to find the
optimal protocol the applications should use when multiple
verification techniques are offered by the runtime.
E. Optimal strategies with guaranteed verifications
Theoretically, various protocols that couple verification
and checkpointing have been studied. Aupy et al. [1]
propose and analyze two simple patterns: one with k
checkpoints and one verification, and the other with k
verifications and one checkpoint. The latter pattern, which
needs to maintain only one checkpoint, is also analyzed
in [6] to accommodate both fail-stop and silent errors.
Benoit et al. [7] extend the analysis of [1] by including
p checkpoints and q verifications that are interleaved to
form arbitrary patterns. All of these results assume the
use of guaranteed verifications only.
As already mentioned, the only analysis that includes
partial verifications in the pattern is the recent work
of [12]. However, [12] restricts to a single type of partial
verification. In this paper, we provide the first theoretical
analysis that includes partial verifications of different
types.
III. Model
We consider divisible-load applications, where check-
points and verifications can be inserted anywhere in the
execution of the application. The occurrence of silent errors
follows a Poisson process with arrival rate λ = 1/µ, where
µ denotes the MTBF of the platform.
We enforce resilience through the use of a pattern that
repeats periodically throughout the execution, as discussed
in Section I. When an error is detected inside a pattern,
either by a partial verification or by the guaranteed
verification, we roll back to the beginning of the pattern
and recover from the last checkpoint (taken at the end of
the execution of the previous pattern, or initial data for
the first pattern). Since the last verification of the pattern
is guaranteed, we need to maintain only one checkpoint at
any time, and it is always valid. The objective is to find
a pattern that minimizes the expected execution time of
the application.
Let C denote the cost of checkpointing, R the cost
of recovery and V ∗ the cost of guaranteed verification.
Furthermore, there are k types of detectors available, and
the detector type D(j), where 1 ≤ j ≤ k, is characterized
by its cost V (j) and recall r(j). For convenience, we also
define g(j) = 1 − r(j) (proportion of undetected errors)
and let D∗ be the guaranteed detector with cost V ∗ and
recall r∗ = 1.
A pattern Pattern(W,n,α,D) is defined by its total
length W , the number n of segments in the pattern, a vec-
tor α = [α1, α2, . . . , αn]T containing the proportions of the
segment sizes, and a vector D = [D1, D2, . . . , Dn−1, D∗]T
containing the detectors used at the end of each seg-
ment. We also define the vector of segment sizes w =
[w1, w2, . . . , wn]T . Formally, for each segment i, where
1 ≤ i ≤ n, wi is the size of the segment, αi = wiW is
the proportion of the segment size in the whole pattern,
and Di is the detector used at the end of the segment. We
have
∑n
i=1 αi = 1, and
∑n
i=1 wi = W . If i < n, Di has
cost Vi and recall ri (we have Di = D(j) for some type j,
1 ≤ j ≤ k), and Dn = D∗ of cost V ∗ and recall r∗ = 1.
Note that the same detector type D(j) may well be used
at the end of several segments. For notational convenience,
we let gi = 1− ri be the probability that the i-th detector
of the pattern fails to detect an error (for 1 ≤ i < n),
and g[i,j[ =
∏j−1
k=i gk be the probability that the error
remains undetected by the detectors Di to Dj−1 (for
1 ≤ i < j < n). In the example of Figure 1, we have
W = w1 +w2 +w3 and n = 3. The first partial verification
has cost V1 with recall r1, and the second one has cost V2
with recall r2.
LetWbase denote the base time of an application without
any overhead due to resilience techniques (without loss
of generality, we assume unit-speed execution). Suppose
the execution is divided into periodic patterns, defined by
Pattern(W,n,α,D). Let E(W ) be the expected execu-
tion time of the pattern. Then, the expected makespan
Wfinal of the application when taking silent errors into
account can be bounded as follows:⌊
Wbase
W
⌋
× E(W ) ≤Wfinal ≤
⌈
Wbase
W
⌉
× E(W ).
This is because the execution involves
⌊
Wbase
W
⌋
full patterns,
and terminates by a (possibly) incomplete one. For large
jobs, we approximate the execution time as
Wfinal ≈ E(W )
W
×Wbase.
Let H(W ) = E(W )W − 1 denote the execution overhead of
the pattern. We obtain Wfinal ≈ Wbase + H(W ) ×Wbase.
Thus, minimizing the expected makespan is equivalent to
minimizing the pattern overhead H(W ).
We assume that errors only strike the computations,
while verifications and I/O transfers (checkpointing and
recovery) are protected and are thus error-free.
IV. Properties of Optimal Patterns
In this section, we first show how to compute the
expected execution time of any given pattern (Section
IV-A), and then we derive a closed-form formula that is
exact up to second-order terms. Based on this key result,
we are able to characterize the optimal length of a pattern
(Section IV-B), and to compute the optimal positions of
the partial verifications (Section IV-C).
A. Expected execution time of a pattern
Consider any given pattern Pattern(W,n,α,D). The
following proposition computes the expected execution
time of this pattern.
Proposition 1. The expected execution time to execute a
pattern Pattern(W,n,α,D) is
E(W ) = W +
n∑
i=1
Vi + C
+ λW (R+WαTAα+ dTα) + o(λ), (1)
where A is an n × n symmetric matrix defined by
Aij = 12
(
1 + g[i,j[
)
for i ≤ j, and d is an n × 1 vector
defined by di =
∑n
j=i g[i,j[Vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. Let qi denote the probability that an error occurs
in the execution of segment i. We can express the expected
execution time of the pattern recursively as follows:
E(W ) =
(
n∏
k=1
(1− qk)
)
C +
(
1−
n∏
k=1
(1− qk)
)
(R+ E(W ))
+
n∑
i=1
(
i−1∑
j=1
(
j−1∏
k=1
(1− qk)
)
qjg[j,i[ +
i−1∏
k=1
(1− qk)
)
(wi + Vi).
(2)
The first line shows that checkpointing will only be taken
if no error has occurred in all the segments, which happens
with probability
∏n
k=1(1− qk), and in all the other cases,
the application needs to recover from the last checkpoint
and then re-computes the entire pattern. The second line
shows the expected cost involved in the execution of each
segment of the pattern and the associated verification.
To better understand it, consider the third segment of
size w3 and the verification D3 right after it, which will
be executed only when the following events happen (with
the probability of each event in brackets):
• There is a fault in the first segment (q1), which is
missed by the first verification (1−r1 = g1) and again
missed by the second verification (1− r2 = g2).
• There is no fault in the first segment (1 − q1), and
there is a fault in the second segment (q2), which is
missed by the second verification (1− r2 = g2).
• There is no fault in the first segment (1− q1) and no
fault in the second segment (1− q2).
Thus, the expected cost involved in the execution of this
segment is given by(
q1g1g2 + (1− q1)q2g2 + (1− q1)(1− q2)
)
(w3 + V3)
=
(
q1g[1,3[ + (1− q1)q2g[2,3[ + (1− q1)(1− q2)
)
(w3 + V3).
We can generalize this reasoning to express the expected
cost to execute the i-th segment of the pattern, which
leads to Equation (2).
Since errors arrive according to the Poisson process, by
definition, we have qi = 1 − e−λwi . Substituting it into
the recursive formula and solving for E(W ), we obtain the
expected execution time as
E(W ) = C + (eλW − 1)R
+
n∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
(eλWj,n − eλWj+1,n)g[j,i[ + eλWi,n
 (wi + Vi),
whereWi,j =
∑j
k=i wk. Approximating eλx = 1+λx+o(λ)
to the first-order term, we can further simplify the expected
execution time as
E(W ) = C + λWR+ o(λ)
+
n∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
λwjg[j,i[ + 1 + λ
n∑
j=i
wj
 (wi + Vi)
= W + λWR+
n∑
i=1
Vi + C + o(λ)
+ λ
n∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
wjg[j,i[ +
n∑
j=i
wj
 (wi + Vi).
Letting F =
∑n
i=1
(∑i−1
j=1 wjg[j,i[ +
∑n
j=i wj
)
(wi + Vi),
we have the following matrix form:
F = wTMw+ dTw,
where M is the following n× n matrix
M =

1 g[1,2[ g[1,3[ . . . g[1,n[
1 1 g[2,3[ . . . g[2,n[
...
...
... . . .
...
1 1 1 . . . 1
 .
For instance, when n = 4 we have
M =

1 g1 g1g2 g1g2g3
1 1 g2 g2g3
1 1 1 g3
1 1 1 1
 .
Replacing M by A = M+MT2 gives the same value for F ,
and we obtain the following symmetric matrix
A = 12

2 1 + g[1,2[ . . . 1 + g[1,n[
1 + g[1,2[ 2 . . . 1 + g[2,n[
...
... . . .
...
1 + g[1,n[ 1 + g[2,n[ . . . 2
 .
Now, by using w = Wα, we obtain Equation (1). This
completes the proof of the proposition.
B. Optimal length of a pattern to minimize the overhead
In this section, we compute the overhead H(W ) of a
pattern Pattern(W,n,α,D) and show how to compute
its length W to minimize this overhead. We introduce two
key parameters.
Definition 1. Consider a pattern Pattern(W,n,α,D).
The fault-free overhead off of the pattern is
off =
n∑
i=1
Vi + C, (3)
and the fraction of re-executed work in case of faults is
fre = αTAα. (4)
Proposition 2. The execution overhead of a pattern
Pattern(W,n,α,D) is minimized when its length is
W ∗ =
√
off
λfre
. (5)
In that case, we have
H(W ∗) = 2
√
λofffre + o(
√
λ). (6)
Proof. From Equation (1), we directly derive
H(W ) = E(W )
W
− 1 = λR+ off
W
+ λfreW + λdTα+ o(λ).
The optimal pattern length that minimizes the execution
overhead can now be computed from the above equation,
and it is given by Equation (5).
Substituting W ∗ back into H(W ), the execution over-
head is given by
H(W ∗) = 2
√
λofffre + λ(R+ dTα) + o(λ)
= 2
√
λofffre + o(
√
λ).
This completes the proof of the proposition.
When the platform MTBF µ = 1/λ is large in front
of the resilience parameters, Equation (6) shows that the
expected execution overhead of the optimal pattern is dom-
inated by 2
√
λofffre, and the last term becomes negligible.
The problem is then reduced to the minimization of the
product offfre. Intuitively, this calls for a tradeoff between
fault-free overhead and fault-induced re-execution, as a
smaller fault-free overhead off tends to induce a larger
re-execution fraction fre, and vice versa.
C. Optimal positions of verifications to minimize fre
To fully characterize an optimal pattern, we have to
determine its number of segments, and the type and
position of each partial verification. In this section, we
consider a pattern whose number of segments is given,
as well as the type of all partial verifications, that is,
the value of off (see Equation (3)) is given. We show
how to determine the optimal length of each segment
(or equivalently, the optimal position of each verification),
so as to minimize the value of fre (see Equation (4)). The
result is the most technically involved contribution of this
paper, and its lengthy proof is available in the companion
research report [2].
Theorem 1. Consider a pattern Pattern(W,n,α,D)
where W , n, and D are given. The fraction of re-executed
work fre is minimized when α = α∗, where
α∗k =
1
Un
× 1− gk−1gk(1 + gk−1)(1 + gk) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, (7)
with g0 = gn = 0 and
Un = 1 +
n−1∑
i=1
1− gi
1 + gi
. (8)
In that case, the value of fre is
f∗re =
1
2
(
1 + 1
Un
)
. (9)
Proof sketch. The goal is to minimize fre = αTAα subject
to the constraint cTα = 1, where c = [1, 1, · · · , 1]T . We
can show the following properties (proofs are omitted;
see [2] for the details):
• A is symmetric positive definite (SPD);
• α∗ is a valid solution, i.e., cTα∗ = 1;
• Aα∗ = f∗rec.
From the fact that A is SPD, we can derive a unique
optimal solution foptre = 1cTA−1c to the optimization
problem obtained at αopt = A−1ccTA−1c . Since Aα
∗ = f∗rec, we
have α∗ = f∗reA−1c and hence 1 = cTα∗ = f∗re(cTA−1c).
This leads to foptre = f∗re and αopt = α∗.
When all the partial verifications in the pattern have
the same type, i.e., gk = g for all 1 ≤ k < n, we retrieve
the result of [12], obtaining f∗re = 12
(
1 + 1+gn(1−g)+2g
)
with
α∗k =
{
1
n(1−g)+2g for k = 1, n
1−g
n(1−g)+2g for k = 2, . . . , n− 1
.
Theorem 1 also shows that, for a given set of partial
verifications in a pattern, the minimum value of fre does
not depend upon their ordering within the pattern.
Corollary 1. For a given set of partial verifications within
a pattern, the minimum fraction of re-executed work f∗re is
independent of their ordering.
V. Complexity
This section builds upon the previous results to provide
a comprehensive complexity analysis. We introduce the
accuracy-to-cost ratio of a detector and show that it is the
key parameter to compute the optimal rational solution
(Section V-A). Then we establish the NP-completeness
to determine the optimal integer solution (Section V-B).
On the positive side, we design a simple greedy algorithm
whose performance is guaranteed, and sketch the construc-
tion of an FPTAS for the problem (Section V-C).
A. Accuracy-to-cost ratio and rational solution
Consider a pattern Pattern(W,n,α,D). Let mj de-
note the number of partial verifications using detector
type D(j) in the pattern (the number of indices i < n such
that Di is of type D(j)), and define m = [m1,m2, . . . ,mk].
Section IV-B shows that minimizing the execution over-
head of the pattern is equivalent to minimizing the
product offfre. From Equations (3) and (9), we have
offfre = V
∗+C
2 f(m), where
f(m) =
(
1 + 1
1 +
∑k
j=1mja
(j)
)1 + k∑
j=1
mjb
(j)
 .
(10)
In Equation (10), we define a(j) = 1−g
(j)
1+g(j) to be the accuracy
of detector D(j) and define b(j) = V (j)V ∗+C to be the relative
cost of D(j). Furthermore, we define φ(j) = a(j)
b(j)
to be the
accuracy-to-cost ratio of D(j). We will show that this ratio
plays a key role in selecting the best detector(s).
Altogether, minimizing the pattern overhead amounts to
finding the solution m = [m1,m2, . . . ,mk] that minimizes
f(m), with mj ∈ N0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Indeed, once
m is given, Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 completely
characterize the optimal pattern, giving its length W , the
number of segments n =
∑k
j=1mj+1, and the locations α
of all partial detectors (whose ordering does not matter).
We first derive the optimal solution if we relax the
integer constraint on m. A rational solution in this case
is denoted by m¯ = [m¯1, m¯2, . . . , m¯k] with m¯j ≥ 0 for all
1 ≤ j ≤ k. The optimal value of f(m¯) is a lower bound on
the optimal integer solution.
Lemma 1. Suppose there are k types of detectors sorted
in non-increasing order of accuracy-to-cost ratio, i.e.,
φ(1) ≥ φ(2) ≥ · · · ≥ φ(k). Then,
f∗(m¯) =

(√
1
φ(1)
+
√
1− 1
φ(1)
)2
if φ(1) > 2
2 otherwise
.
Proof. First, we prove that the optimal rational solution is
achieved when only the detector with the largest accuracy-
to-cost ratio φ(1) is used. Specifically, given any rational
solution m¯ = [m¯1, m¯2, . . . , m¯k], we show that there exists a
solution m¯′ = [m¯′1, 0, . . . , 0], which satisfies f(m¯′) ≤ f(m¯).
We have
f(m¯) =
(
1 + 1
1 +
∑k
j=1 m¯ja
(j)
)1 + k∑
j=1
m¯jb
(j)

=
(
1 + 1
1 + a(1)
∑k
j=1
m¯ja(j)
a(1)
)1 + b(1) k∑
j=1
m¯jb
(j)
b(1)
 .
(11)
Let m¯′1 =
∑k
j=1
m¯ja
(j)
a(1)
and n¯′1 =
∑k
j=1
m¯jb
(j)
b(1)
. Since
b(j)
b(1)
≥ a(j)
a(1)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, we get n¯′1 =
∑k
j=1
m¯jb
(j)
b(1)
≥∑k
j=1
m¯ja
(j)
a(1)
= m¯′1. Hence, Equation (11) can be written
as
f(m¯) =
(
1 + 11 + a(1)m¯′1
)(
1 + b(1)n¯′1
)
=
(
1 + 11 + a(1)m¯′1
)(
1 + b
(1)n¯′1
m¯′1
· m¯′1
)
≥
(
1 + 11 + a(1)m¯′1
)(
1 + b(1)m¯′1
)
= f(m¯′).
Now, define f(m¯) =
(
1 + 11+a(1)m¯
) (
1 + b(1)m¯
)
. The fol-
lowing derives the minimum value of f(m¯). Differentiating
f(m¯) with respect to m¯ and solving ∂f(m¯)∂m¯ = 0, we get
m¯∗ = − 1
a(1)
+
√
1
a(1)
(
1
b(1)
− 1
a(1)
)
, (12)
which is positive (hence a potential solution) if φ(1) =
a(1)
b(1)
> 2. Taking the second-order derivative of f(m¯), we
get
∂2f(m¯)
∂m¯2
= 2a
(1)(a(1) − b(1))
(a(1)m¯+ 1)3 ,
which is positive (hence ensures that the solution is the
unique minimum) for all m¯ ∈ [0,∞) if φ(1) = a(1)
b(1)
> 1.
Thus, when φ(1) > 2, the optimal solution is obtained
by substituting m¯∗ into f(m¯), and we get
f(m¯∗) =
(
1 + 11 + a(1)m¯∗
)(
1 + b(1)m¯∗
)
=
(
1 + 1√
φ(1) − 1
)(
1− 1
φ(1)
+
√
1
φ(1)
(
1− 1
φ(1)
))
=
(√
1
φ(1)
+
√
1− 1
φ(1)
)2
.
When φ(1) ≤ 2, the minimum value of f(m¯) is achieved
at m¯ = 0, which gives f(0) = 2.
Lemma 1 shows that the optimal rational solution is
achieved with only one detector, namely, the one with
the highest accuracy-to-cost ratio. The optimal integer
solution, however, may use more than one detector. The
following shows that finding the optimal integer solution
is NP-complete.
B. NP-completeness
We show that finding the optimal integer solution
m is NP-complete, even when all detectors share the
same accuracy-to-cost ratio. In particular, we consider
the following decision problem.
Definition 2 (Multiple Partial Verifications (MPV)).
Given k detectors with the same accuracy-to-cost ratio φ,
i.e., a(j)
b(j)
= φ for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and a bound K, is there a
solution m that satisfies
(
1 + 1
1 +
∑k
j=1mja
(j)
)1 + k∑
j=1
mjb
(j)
 ≤ K? (13)
Theorem 2. The MPV problem is NP-complete.
Proof. The MPV problem is obviously in NP. We prove the
completeness by a reduction from the Unbounded Subset
Sum (USS) problem, which is known to be NP-complete
[21]. Given a multiset S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} of k positive
integers and a positive integer I, the USS problem asks if
there exists a subset S′ ⊆ S whose sum is exactly I, i.e.,∑k
j=1mjsj = I, where mj ∈ N0. We can further assume
that I/sj is not an integer for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, since otherwise
we would have a trivial solution.
Given an instance of the USS problem, we construct
an instance of the MPV problem with k detectors. First,
choose any φ ∈
(
2, (I/smax + 1)2 + 1
)
, where smax =
maxj=1..k sj . Then, let ab = φ and − 1a +
√
1
a
( 1
b − 1a
)
= I,
so we can get a =
√
φ−1−1
I and b =
√
φ−1−1
φI . For each
1 ≤ j ≤ k, define a(j) = sja and b(j) = sjb. According
to the range of φ, we have a(j) < 1 and b(j) < 1 for all
1 ≤ j ≤ k. Finally, let K =
(√
1
φ +
√
1− 1φ
)2
.
If we use only one detector, say D(j), then Lemma 1
shows that Equation (13) is satisfied with the following
unique solution:
m∗j = −
1
a(j)
+
√
1
a(j)
(
1
b(j)
− 1
a(j)
)
= 1
sj
(
−1
a
+
√
1
a
(
1
b
− 1
a
))
= I
sj
,
which is not an integer by hypothesis, but achieves the
lower bound
(√
1
φ +
√
1− 1φ
)2
= K. Now, we show that,
by using multiple detectors, an integer solution to the MPV
instance exists if and only if there is an integer solution
to the USS instance.
(⇒) Suppose there is an integer solution m =
[m1,m2, . . . ,mk] such that
∑k
j=1mjsj = I. Then, by
employing mj partial verifications of detector type D(j)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, we get(
1 + 1
1 +
∑k
j=1mja
(j)
)1 + k∑
j=1
mjb
(j)

=
(
1 + 1
1 + a
∑k
j=1mjsj
)1 + b k∑
j=1
mjsj

=
(
1 + 11 + aI
)
(1 + bI) =
(√
1
φ
+
√
1− 1
φ
)2
= K.
(⇐) Suppose there is an integer solution m =
[m1,m2, . . . ,mk] to the MPV instance such that(
1 + 1
1 +
∑k
j=1mja
(j)
)1 + k∑
j=1
mjb
(j)
 = K.
This implies(
1 + 1
1 + a
∑k
j=1mjsj
)1 + b k∑
j=1
mjsj

= 1 + 2
√
1
φ
(
1− 1
φ
)
.
Let T =
∑k
j=1mjsj . Solving T from the equation above,
we get the following unique solution:
T = −1
a
+
√
1
a
(
1
b
− 1
a
)
= I.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
C. Greedy algorithm and FPTAS
To cope with the NP-completeness of minimizing offfre,
there is a simple and intuitive greedy algorithm. This
greedy algorithm uses only the detector with the highest
accuracy-to-cost ratio φ(1). We compute the optimal
rational number of partial verifications m¯∗ and then round
it up if it is not an integer. In Section VI, we show that
this algorithm performs quite well in practice.
Interestingly, we can guarantee the performance of
this simple algorithm. From Lemma 1, we can assume
φ(1) = a(1)
b(1)
> 2. Since a(1) < 1, we can get b(1) < 1/2. If
the optimal fractional solution m¯∗ given in Equation (12)
happens to be an integer, then we get the optimal solution.
Otherwise, rounding it to dm¯∗e increases the objective
function f(m) shown in Equation (10) by at most a factor
of δ = 1 + b(1) < 3/2. According to Equation (6), this
gives a
√
3/2-approximation algorithm for minimizing the
expected execution overhead (and hence the makespan).
In the following, we show that it is possible to have a fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS), which
ensures, for any  > 0, that the solution is within 1+ times
the optimal, and that the running time of the algorithm
is polynomial in the input size and 1/. To develop the
FPTAS, we perform the following transformations to the
problem.
First, we convert all parameters in Equation (10) to
integers. Since a(j) = 1−g
(j)
1+g(j) =
r(j)
2−r(j) ≤ 1 and r(j) is
rational, we can write a(j) = pjqj , where pj and qj are
positive integers with pj ≤ qj . We assume that C, V ∗ and
all the V (j)’s are also integers. Thus, minimizing f(m) is
equivalent to minimizing the following function:
F (m) =
(
1 + L
L+
∑k
j=1mjL
(j)
)(
C + V ∗ +
k∑
j=1
mjV
(j)
)
,
where L denotes the least common multiple (LCM) of
q1, q2, . . . , qk, and L(j) = pjqj L ≤ L. Clearly, L and all the
L(j)’s can be represented by a polynomial function of the
original input size.
Next, we compute an upper bound on the number of
partial verifications. Observe that F (0) = 2(C + V ∗) and
F (m) ≥ C + V ∗ + ∑kj=1mjV (j). This implies that the
optimal solution must satisfy mj ≤ C+V ∗V (j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Therefore, it follows that
∑k
j=1mjV
(j) ≤ k(C + V ∗). The
bound on mj allows us to transform the unbounded prob-
lem to the 0-1 problem by providing blogmjc additional
copies of each item type j with doubling V (j) and L(j)
values. This is a standard technique also used in transform-
ing the bounded and unbounded knapsack problems to
the 0-1 knapsack problem [24]. The total number of items
becomes K =
∑k
j=1 (1 + blogmjc) = O(k log(C + V ∗)),
which stays polynomial in the input size.
Define x = [x1, x2, . . . , xK ], and let Lj and Vj be
the value and cost of item j, respectively. We can now
formulate the optimization problem as follows:
minimize F (x) =
(
1 + L
L+
∑K
j=1 xjLj
)(
C + V ∗ +
K∑
j=1
xjVj
)
subject to
K∑
j=1
xjVj ≤ k(C + V ∗)
xj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j = 1, 2, . . . ,K
and the size of all parameters is a polynomial function of
the input size of the original problem. To find an FPTAS for
the problem above, we adopt the technique used in [15] for
designing an FPTAS for the Maximum Density Knapsack
(MDK) problem described below.
Maximum Density Knapsack (MDK): Given a set
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sK} of K items, where each item sj ∈ S
has a positive integer profit pj and a positive integer
weight wj , a total capacity W , and an initial weight w0,
the MDK problem is formulated as:
maximize
∑K
j=1 xjpj
w0 +
∑K
j=1 xjwj
subject to
K∑
j=1
xjwj ≤W
xj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j = 1, 2, . . . ,K
Cohen and Katzir [15] give an FPTAS for the MDK
problem by using the existing FPTAS for the knapsack
problem [24]. In particular, their algorithm relies on the
property that, for every profit P , a minimum weight
solution x is found such that P (x) =
∑K
j=1 xjpj ≥ b P1+′ c,
for any ′ > 0. This immediately gives rise to an FPTAS
for MDK.
We can apply the same technique to construct an FPTAS
for minimizing F (x). Let xopt denote the optimal solution.
By considering Vj as weight and Lj as profit, we can
run the FPTAS for knapsack and return in polynomial
time a solution x that satisfies P (x) ≥ bP (xopt)1+′ c and
W (x) ≤ W (xopt). By setting carefully the value of ′ as
a function of , the solution yields F (x) ≤ (1 + )F (xopt).
The detail is similar to the one presented in [15] and is
omitted here.
VI. Simulations
Simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance
improvement that partial verifications can provide. Unlike
with a single detector type, the number of different patterns
to consider, while searching for the optimal one, grows
exponentially with multiple detector types (e.g., there are
64 different patterns with three partial verifications of
four types). Since Corollary 1 shows that the ordering of
partial verifications does not matter, only unique patterns
need to be considered to find the optimal one (20 different
patterns remain in the above example). We implement
the optimal algorithms using a single detector type as
well as multiple detector types in Maple, and conduct
simulations with realistic detector values. The expected
overhead of the algorithm employing partial verifications
is compared with that of the baseline algorithm, which
uses only a single guaranteed verification. The reduction in
overhead illustrates the usefulness of partial verifications.
Section VI-A describes the experimental setup, including
the scenarios and the range of parameter values. Results
are presented in Section VI-B by exploring two problem
instances.
A. Simulation framework
This section provides information about the parameters
used for instantiating the performance model. We have
chosen realistic parameters that depict a typical expected
exascale platform. The target platform consists of 105
nodes whose individual MTBF is 100 years, which amounts
to a platform MTBF of µ = 31536 seconds (i.e., about
8.7 hours). The global size of the memory for an exascale
machine is expected to be between 32 PB and 64 PB;
divided by the number of nodes (105), the memory size
per node goes from 320 GB to 640 GB. Most HPC
applications try to populate 90% of the node memory
but only 10%− 50% of the memory is checkpointed. That
makes the checkpoint size between 30 GB and 300 GB.
At exascale, most checkpoints will be done in local non-
volatile memory (NVM), which is known to be slower than
DRAM. We assume checkpoint throughput between 0.5
GB/s and 1 GB/s.
Concerning the SDC detectors, we assume a first detec-
tor D(1) with a throughput of about 200 MB/s/process
and a recall of 0.5 [3], [5]. The second one D(2) has a
throughput of about 20 MB/s/process and a recall of
0.95 [9]. If we assume 512 processes per node at exascale,
then the node throughput of the detectors becomes 100
GB/s for D(1) and 10 GB/s for D(2). Finally, we assume
a third detector D(3), which is an optimized version that
combines the features of the first two detectors, achieving
a recall of 0.8 and a throughput of 50 GB/s. Concerning
the perfect detector D∗, we assume a throughput of 0.5
GB/s based on the fact that application-specific detectors
are usually based on physical properties such as mass or
energy conservation, which requires global communications
and is therefore more expensive than purely local checks.
In the first instance, we evaluate our model with three
detectors D(1), D(2) and D(3) (with respective costs and
recall values V (1) = 3 seconds, V (2) = 30 seconds, V (3) = 6
seconds and r(1) = 0.5, r(2) = 0.95, r(3) = 0.8). The
checkpointing cost and the perfect detector cost (with
recall r∗ = 1) are fixed at C = V ∗ = 600 seconds. We
compute the expected overhead for each detector as a
function of number of partial verifications (m from 0 to
up to 35). We then assess the performance of a detector
and its effect on the execution overhead.
The second instance targets applications with various
datasets that expose a change in detection recall [5],
[4]. Therefore, it assumes a range of the recall for each
detector rather than a single value: r(1) = [0.5, 0.9],
r(2) = [0.75, 0.95], and r(3) = [0.8, 0.99]. Given a dataset,
we obtain a value of recall for each detector, within the
interval. This is because different datasets might expose
different levels of entropy and therefore the detectors might
expose different prediciton accuracy, hence different recall.
We note that although the recall might be different for
different datasets, the work done, hence the detection cost,
is the same. We compare the greedy algorithm to the
optimal solution for different datasets, keeping the same
values for C, V ∗ and µ.
B. Results and analysis
Based on the above framework, we report the simulation
results highlighting the observed overheads, and the
improvements achieved by employing partial verifications.
1) Performance of detectors and impact of m: Figure 2
shows the performance of the three detectors D(1), D(2)
and D(3), and assesses the impact of the number m
of partial verifications on the execution overhead. The
Figure 2. Expected overhead against the number of partial ver-
ifications when a single type of detector is employed for three
different detectors (with their respective cost and recall values). In
the simulation, C = V ∗ = 600, and µ = 31536.
plot also shows the overhead of the baseline algorithm,
which is approximately 39%, represented by m = 0. The
expected overhead is reduced for all three detectors by
employing partial verifications. For each detector, the
optimal overhead is attained for a particular value of m,
corroborating the theoretical study. After this point, it
starts rising again due to the fact that forcing too many
verifications will eventually lead the error-free overhead
to rise. The improvement in overhead over the baseline
algorithm is 9% for detectors D(1) and D(3) (optimal
overhead for both is ≈ 30%), and 7% for detector D(3)
(optimal overhead is ≈ 32%). Concerning the performance
of detectors, we can see that D(1) and D(3) are slightly
better than D(2), due to their higher accuracy-to-cost
ratios. However, for m ≤ 2, D(2) is better due to its
higher recall, while its performance degrades as more D(2)
detectors are employed due to its high cost.
2) Performance of the greedy algorithm: In this second
instance, the recall of each detector is within a recall
interval, and its value depends on the dataset. Even
with the intervals, because of the high cost, D(2) always
has a lower accuracy-to-cost ratio when compared to
D(1) and D(3), which share similar ratios. We show that
the greedy algorithm presented in Section V-C performs
extremely well in practice, even though the optimal pattern
Table I
Performance comparison of greedy algorithm and optimal
solution. In all scenarios, C = V ∗ = 600, V (1) = 3, V (3) = 6.
m overhead H diff. from opt.
Scenario 1: r(1) = 0.51, r(3) = 0.82, φ(1) ≈ 137, φ(3) ≈ 139
Optimal solution (1, 15) 29.828% 0%
Greedy with D(3) (0, 16) 29.829% 0.001%
Scenario 2: r(1) = 0.58, r(3) = 0.9, φ(1) ≈ 163, φ(3) ≈ 164
Optimal solution (1, 14) 29.659% 0%
Greedy with D(3) (0, 15) 29.661% 0.002%
Scenario 3: r(1) = 0.64, r(3) = 0.97, φ(1) ≈ 188, φ(3) ≈ 188
Optimal solution (1, 13) 29.523% 0%
Greedy with D(1) (27, 0) 29.524% 0.001%
Greedy with D(3) (0, 14) 29.525% 0.002%
may employ both D(1) and D(3) in the solution.
Indeed, we identify three scenarios where a combination
of D(1) and D(3) constitutes the optimal pattern, as
presented in Table I. In all of them, the greedy algorithm,
which uses only the detector with the highest accuracy-to-
cost ratio, performs within 0.002% of the optimal solution.
VII. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we provided a comprehensive analysis of a
computing pattern that employs different types of partial
verifications for detecting silent errors in HPC applications.
We showed that the optimization problem is NP-complete
in general, and proposed a greedy algorithm as well as
an FPTAS for choosing the number of detectors to be
used, as well as their types and locations in the pattern.
Simulations based on realistic detector settings show that
the greedy algorithm works well in practice, and confirm
their usefulness in tackling SDCs on exascale systems.
In future work, we will investigate the impact of false
positives on the performance of partial verification patterns.
False positives are characterized by the precision value,
which is the number of true errors over the total number
of errors raised by a detector. In many partial detectors, a
tradeoff exists between the recall and precision by adjusting
the detection parameters. Analyzing a pattern in the
presence of both false positives and false negatives will
refine the assessment of the usefulness of partial detectors.
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